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Introduction

Socialism is based on the working class. The interests of the working class, however, encompass the entire world. The proletariat wants and should become the bearer of civilization. Therefore, in its idealistic striving, it has long since stepped beyond the confines of the wage relationship and has turned its interest to the most diverse problems of economics, politics, and culture. Our journal knows of no issue of public life that could remain outside the scope of its socialist perspective. We cannot devote equal space to all problems because their social significance varies, but we will have to deal with most of what comes to the forefront of public attention: with the eight-hour day and rising food prices as well as with Turkish finances, Russian peasant conditions, the question of the economic unification of Europe, the American financial market, the nationalization of the German coal mines, the national development of the Serbs or the Czechs, the situation of the Russian Jews, ocean trade, China, and Japan, with India and Persia, with the policies of the big banks and with the efforts of anti-alcoholics, with literary movements, art movements, and with accident prevention, industrial hygiene, etc. etc. We have no particular subject, since we live in a time that is transforming everything. First and foremost, we will, of course, devote our attention to the economic and cultural upheaval brought about by the World War. Guided by the socialist perspective, this journal aims to be independent in its judgment. Socialist knowledge has become broad and shallow; it has lost its depth and revolutionary momentum. People have learned to adapt to ignorance and lack of understanding in order to become popular more quickly. A unique socialist tradition has developed, which, like every tradition, had a conservative effect. We want to keep ourselves free from all of this; we also do not want to allow our judgment to be influenced by friendly and comradely considerations, or even by pity for the weak and oppressed. We do not want to flatter the poor. We will speak the whole, naked truth openly and freely regardless of who this benefits or harms.

For knowledge is the highest thing the individual can contribute to the progress of humanity. We want to be read, but we do not seek the favor of the public. We prefer honest and brave opponents to faint-hearted friends. We do not fear the clash of opinions; rather, we seek it out: for only in the battle of minds do views become clear. But under all circumstances, we are for unity in the action of the proletariat. Whoever still seeks to disturb the many experiences of the proletarian class struggle can no longer do so out of / immaculate ignorance, but is committing a crime against the working class. Anyone who really has something to say is welcome as a collaborator. We don't look at names, we don't recognize authorities. Anyone who has facts or ideas to present that can serve to clarify the situation in general or in individual countries, in individual areas, should receive an unbiased evaluation.

German Social Democracy.

The Stronghold of Socialism. Before the war, for at least a generation, German Social Democracy was considered the stronghold of socialism; ever since the Social Democratic faction approved the war credits, it has been insignificant in the eyes of foreign socialists. Formerly, the organizations, the press, and the scientific literature of German Social Democracy were the pride of the International; now, no one thinks about it anymore. Formerly, one admired the sense of purpose with which the German proletariat expressed its class will-now, Emile Vandervelde declares that he does not know whether the German people are yet ripe for the Republic.[1] One

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[1] In "L'Humanité" of June 22, 1915, E. Vandervelde says in his reply to Scheidemann: "I am not even sure, I disappoint you, that Germany your Germany, is ready for the Republie.". Aftewthis stylistic test, it would be interesting to learn what E. Vandervelde now thinks about whether Russia is ready for the Republic. In September 1914, E. Vandervelde addressed a letter to the Russian socialists in which he urgently pointed out to them that the democratically governed states needed Russia's military assistance. Under the given circumstances, this warning could only have a purpose if it were to induce the Russian revolutionaries to to abandon their fight against Tsarism during the war. Even before the war,

lumps German Social Democracy together with the bourgeois parties, sets the Junkers above the whole, and the Kaiser above the Junkers, and the slogan is complete! Worse than a slogan is a fetish! The Kaiser appears in the imagination efithese people as the embodiment of the — principle of Satan, the Antichrist. Thus, they tear the war out of all its context and place it on a personal-peak; the pyramid is inverted, but of course only in the imagination! They forget the little bit of historical philosophy that some among them. incidentally, only gradually learned from German Social Democracy, and adopt the standpoint of the dog that bites the stick with which it is beaten. German Social Democracy is a historical movement and can only be understood as such The approval of war credits was justified. But even if it had nọt been, it would be just as foolish to believe that the historical role of German Social Democracy could be examipe, ed a socialist era had damed in rante as, the entry of Guesde and Vaillant into the ministry. German Social Democracy was and remains the stronghold of socialism. If this stronghold falls, socialism in general falls with it. One should not indulge in any illusions about this. There can be different opinions on the question of what the German proletariat will achieve in the near future through the energy accumulated in its organizations and its political training. But there can be no doubt about this: if German Social Democracy cannot achieve it, the others certainly will not If it is true that German Social Democracy is close to abandoning its principles, then the socialists of other countries will not be able to retain them for long either. In fact, the supposed violation of principles by German Social Democracy already serves the socialists of other countries as a cover for their own lack of principles. They cry all the louder about the

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the Tsarist government had granted E. Vandervelde a favor that is unique in : Russian political history: he, the foreigner and socialist leader, was : allowed to hold discussions in Petersburg with the Russian Social Democratic Party representatives to bring about party unification. Apparently, even then, Russian government circles were counting not on the socialist and revolutionary Vandervelde, but on the future minister, and they believed even then that Belgium had to be treated as an ally. Incidentally, this also contributed to Belgium's neutrality!

nationalism of German Social Democracy the more they themselves lapse into the worst chauvinism and opportunism. The entire new upswing of the socialist movement that Europe has experienced since the 1980s, including the International, is intimately connected with the history of German Social democracy, which in turn is inseparable from the history of the German Empire and the German people. Let's take a brief look back at how things developed.

The Beginnings: The Influence of the Great French Revolution.

It was the great French Revolution and the world wars that sprang from it that first shook Germany politically. The emancipation of the peasants, elementary schools, universal conscription, and an intellectual movement that ventured to tackle the principles of world order were the consequences. History was later falsified by focusing on Napoleon. Napoleon was made into a fetish, like the German Emperor now. But even if Napoleon's personality played an incomparably greater role in the wars and politics of that time than the German Emperor does today, the emphasis lay not in him, but in the political forces that the bourgeoisie had unleashed in France. In Napoleon himself, people saw only a military genius, his tyranny, and his dynastic interests, and overlooked the great state-building for which he had fought. It was the new bourgeois political order of France that all of Europe wanted to adapt. Therefore, Europe would have advanced by at least half a century if Napoleon had succeeded in maintaining his empire for even just another twenty years The setback, as is well known, came from the Muscovite Empire, which was still insufficiently developed materially and ideologically for the bourgeois state order. Napoleon's army perished due to Russia's roadlessness, its inadequate means of subsistence, and the primitive construction that made it possible to burn down all of Moscow. Now the development of Europe was held back by reactionary force, just as it had previously been driven forward by revolutionary force. It is good to remember this. Russian hegemony in Europe lasted until after 1848, and that was the time of the political stagnation. Only the Crimean War broke the disastrous Russian influence. Only political childish people and historica anoramuses can imagine that the internal policy of a state can be separated from its foreign policy, and that the political regime of such a large empire as Russia concerns only the state itself and not its neighbors. Ever since Russia had become a modern military state, all of Europe

suffered from its political backwardness. Russian Tsarism not only held back Russia's development, but was and remains a tremendous obstacle to European development The clash with the Napoleonic armies brought to the full awareness of the entire German people the curse of German petty states, of ossified The derman bouge isle embarked on its struggle on its struggle for freedom. But the German idea of freedom was at the same time the idea of empire the striving for national unification, for political centralization. By contrast, by this time the general bourgeois ideal had already lost much of the luster with which it had een surrounded in the first years of the great French Revolution. The French Revolution itself had unfolded, in rapid succession, the class struggles that were disintegrating bourgeois society. With the overthrow of Napoleon, the military power of the French revolutionary armies was broken, and the prestige of the European monarchies was restored The minds in Germany were all the more inclined to take a critical look at the French situation because the socia structure of the German lands was not yet as permeated oy capitalism as in France, and revolutionary France initially asserted itself against Germany as a hostilé power that robbed it of its political independence. The workers' struggles in England and the development of socialist ideas in France provided ample material to nourish this critical spirit All that remained was to allow the criticism to pass through the depths of German philosophy, and the system was complete.

The Communist Manifesto and the German Revolution.

This happened in 1847 through the Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Fr. Engels. The historical experience, the social struggles on which the Communist Manifesto is based, relate entirely to France and England. Germany merely provided the philosophical method by means of which the inner workings of bourgeois society built on industrialism, of so-called capitalism, and its social consequences, were revealed. Thus, German philosophy overcame capitalism ideally at a time when it had not yet been materially realized in Germany. From this contradiction, an issue had to develop between the intellectual leaders of the German revolution and the German bourgeoisie, the political bearer of the movement. While German revolutionary thought went far beyond the ideas of the great French Revolution, the German bourgeoisie lagged far behind the French bourgeoisie in its revolutionary behavior. Various factors played a

role. First, the German bourgeoisie felt less strong and was further weakened by political fragmentation. For while in France the bourgeois revolution took place within the centralized state, in Germany this state had to be created through the revolution. Second, the German bourgeoisie had governments before it that already knew how to benefit from the experiences of the French Revolution. Moreover, it had a proletariat behind it that was openly preparing to stab it in the back. The German Revolution collapsed, and from then on the German proletariat became increasingly politically detached from the Bourgeoisie. The radical spirits of the revolution denounce the political betrayal of the bourgeoisie to the workers.[2] Nevertheless, there

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[2] The extent of this discontent can perhaps best be seen from the well-known letter from the later Prussian Finance Minister Miquel to K. Marx. One can hardly go wrong if one notes the sharp emphasis on the state idea in The Communist Manifesto is also attributed to the influence of German conditions. For France had already undergone Proudhonism at that time. K. Marx's overcoming of Proudhon was based on the centralist idea of the state, which was given a revolutionary character by the class separation and class solidarity of the proletariat. After the Paris Commune. Marx somewhat modified his ideas about the state. He found that the proletariat could not take over the ready-made state machinery. The changes he foresaw, however, consisted only in the democratization of the state and the greater independence of the communes. Later, the great vulgarizer of Marx's ideas, Friedrich Engels, following Morgan's research, portrayed the state as a simple machine of oppression. K. Kautsky, who throughout his life spread a diluted version of Engels's vulgarizations as Marxism, then further simplified this Engelsian idea and brought it to the masses. The limited development of anarchism in Germany is also partly due to the popularity of the state idea among the German people. Nor is it certainly a coincidence that the German Social Democrats have always been the spokesperson inthe fight against anarchist tendencies and that it was primarily under their influence that anarchists were banned from international socialist congresses. That is why, apart from the German Kaiser, no one is hated more by the anarchists than the German Social Democrats.

was one idea that united German philosophy as well as the German bourgeoisie and the German workers. It was the idea of the unification of Germany. It cannot be emphasized enough that the Reich idea was a state idea—the idea of the formation of a large national state. France had already gone beyond the idea of the national state, for it had long possessed one; in Germany, it was the object of longing. The Crimean War and the Movement of the Sixties. The period of reaction that followed the 1848 Revolution collapsed in the Crimean War. After the great Russian defeats, Europe breathed a sigh of relief. The socialist movement, liberalism, and the German unification movement resurfaced. K. Marx took over the leadership of the International It was based on a world-political idea. For in order to To carry out this program, the political unification of Europe was a prerequisite. It was a Napoleonic idea, only rewritten in revolutionary terms. With the help of the internationally organized proletariat, Europe was to be united and a socialist world empire created, just as Napoleon had wanted to create a bourgeois world empire with his armed armies. The International was doomed to fail, even if it had not been destroyed by the Bakuninist conspiracy. It was a general staff without an army. The most important thing it left behind are the political rallies of the General Council, i.e., of K. Marx. And this shows best how weak the political basis of the movement still was at that In Germany, Lassalle's agitation began. The fundamental separation of the proletariat from the bourgeoisie, which he carried out, simultaneously meant the unification of the working masses throughout Germany, i.e., the breaking down of the political boundaries that fragmented the German people. In this respect, it was preparatory work for the German Empire. Hence Bismarck's attempts to approach Lassalle. Universal suffrage then provided the parliamentary basis for the development of Social Democracy as a national party. The Franco-Prussian War. A Warning! The Franco-Prussian War came. The German workers, like the entire German people, participated in this war with enthusiasm. A. Bebel and W Liebknecht took an isolated position. Even K. Marx's attitude was wavering. On the question of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, however, he had no doubts; but that was a specific question that could be answered with yes or no, regardless of the general attitude toward the war and its consequences. The German workers were enthusiastic about the war because they associated it with national unification, with the idea of the Reich. Nevertheless, very soon after the victorious war, which had actually brought about national unification, The

national enthusiasm of the workers turned into an oppositional mood, and the rapid upswing of German Social Democracy began. Those who believe that German Social Democracy has been overcome by the national enthusiasm that the current war has in turn triggered should take note of this. The national significance of the 1970s war was certainly much greater for Germany, closer to the masses, than that of the current world ware life even then, nationalism could not hold back the class struggle of the German proletariat, how much less can this be expected for the present?! Incidentally, one is generally mistaken about the character of the national enthusiasm that has now gripped Europe. It is not the beginning of a new nationalist era in modern civilization; rather, it is the conclusion of nationalism, its magnificent and bloody agony. The war has triggered all national feelings, all forces of nationalism that were still rooted in the peoples It is the great mobilization, the great parade of nationalism. One can go no further. Nationalism is exhausted to the nth degree. And yet, precisely this world war has shown that nations cannot isolate themselves nationally in their development. In the intoxication of national enthusiasm, one seeks to eradicate foreign influences in industry, trade, politics, culture, and vocabulary-but even if this could succeed anywhere, one would thereby uproot one's own national culture. It is unparalleled madness to try to disregard the great global connections created by modern commerce. War itself is not about national interests, but about global interests. These connections fall outside of consciousness now that battles are being fought between nations, but they must emerge with all clarity into the light of day after the war. The war created abnormal conditions and abnormal moods. The masses have been catapulted from the complicated machinery of modern economic life and are leading. They live a soldier's life that knows no competition, no worries about food, and almost no differences in property; with death before their eyes, they do not think about the future; the state provides for everything, but it itself lives on bills of exchange for the future, since its usual sources of income are almost exhausted. But when the war is over, everyone will haveito return to their old social position and resume the struggle for existence in the midst of capitalist competition. Then above all, the work of destruction that the war has created will become apparent, andkthe connection that most intimately links production, trade, andicommerce throughout the world. Then, too, the ideas and feelings with which they went to war will be subjected to a revision, and nationalism will not be

able to withstand this revision. Nationalism now burns with a high flame; what will remain is ashes. After the euphoria of victory in 1871, a disillusionment set in among the, German working masses, which soon gave way to political-disenchantment. The workers saw themselves cheated out of victory and also out of the Reich. For their social position was not changed by the victorious war and the founding of the Reich. The capitalisticlass, however, reaped millions. In the first few years after the war, the workers also profited from the business upswing;bbut then came the trade crisis, which threw them onto the pavement and wreaked terrible havoc, especially among the little people, the artisans, merchants, etc. The Socialist Law The rise of social democracy frightened the German government. Bismarck, who was accustomed to using force, created the Anti-Socialist Law. But the working masses identified with the socialist agitators. They perceived the law as a challenge to the working class. The workers were indeed placed in a politically exceptional position by the Anti-Socialist Law. The result was that it led to social democratic agitation, which sought to educate the workers in class politics, also created an external bond that united them separated them from bourgeois society, and brought them into sharp opposition to government power, Since all other forms of public activity were severely restricted, German Social Democracy shifted its attention primarily to parliamentary action. Within ten years of the promulgation of the Socialist Law, it became a strong parliamentary party. To understand this development, we must recall the political fortunes of the German bourgeoisie. After 1871, the German bourgeoisie showed even less independence in its political behavior than before. At that time, the French bourgeoisie proclaimed its social ideal as a world-redeeming idea. This was bourgeois liberalism, whose ultimate consequence is the abolition of the state. Laissez faire, laissez passer The bourgeoisie tells the state: Let us do what we want and step aside! The state only has to protect the property order; everything else is handled commercially: through purchase, sale and free contract. The state's role is left to be that of policeman. The English bourgeoisie has almost completely realized this liberal ideal. In contrast, the German bourgeoisie has not established its own social ideal at all. The French bourgeois was always on the offensive, ready to portray anyone who tampered with capital as an enemy of civilization, or society, of humanity; the English bourgeois grinnec and locked his capital in an iron safe—he knew it was robbery (see Ricardo), but didn't want it stolen by others; the German

bourgeois, himself afflicted by the general doubts about the legitimacy of capitalist acquisition, appealed o the common good and state interests. But all three o hem went about the business of capita accumulation unscrupulously, without considering the interests of their fellow human beings. In addition, the German capitalist class found the world market already occupied when it first appeared. It is known that the English capitalist class was the first to introduce modern machine operation in the most important industries, and that thanks to this circumstance, as well as to English colonial possessions and the expansion of English world trade, it was able to defeat any competition on the continent. England created a monopoly position for itself on the world market. Compared to it, the European mainland was economically little more than a colony. To the free Briton, this state of affairs seemed entirely within the order of things, just as it currently seems right and just to him that England should close the oceans to world trade. The difficulty, the apparent impossibility, of breaking the English industrial monopoly depressed the bourgeoisie on the continent economically and politically, making it modest in its behavior and its demands. The German bourgeoisie did not, from its inception, have economic world plans like the English or the French It merely wanted to make room for itself on the domestic market; the idea of competing with England on the world market was far from its mind, and it actually developed on the basis of the domestic market, following on from railway construction, urban development, and military supplies. The economic stagnation that occurred on the world market after the 1970s trade crisis also acted as a political damper on the bourgeoisie. And so we see that the German bourgeoisie nestles up to government power, submits to it, instead of seizing political power. It doesn't even want that. Its ideal is not liberalism, but a strong empire. And since the empire is under Prussian leadership, it adopts the Prussian state ideal The government feels strong and is implementing an energetic state policy, of which two aspects deserve special emphasis: the nationalization of the railways and workers' insurance. Both remained piecemeal. The nationalization of the railways would have to be accompanied at least by a nationalization of the coal mines. Subsequent developments have shown that a Nationalization of the coal mines would have resulted in magnificent financial and economic the most results. The workers' insurance was inadequate because its financial resources were too limited, because its organization did not give workers' representatives full rights, and because it had failed to

standardize working hours—for establishing a short working day is the most important means of preventing industrial accidents and industrianillnesses. That the Reich government believed it could unseat Social Democracy through workers insurance was, of course, a gross, albeit understandable, error on the part of the statesmen who saw the essence of Social Democracy in Socialist agitation instead of learning to understand it from the social position of the working class and the development of the Reich. Since workers' insurance, was presented as a means of struggle against Social Democracy, it was bound to be! received with the greatest suspicion by the latter. The inadequacies of the planned workers' insurance provided Social Democracy with ample material for the sharpest criticism Furthermore the workers felt the brutal combination of workers' insurance and the Socialist Law-carrot and stick—as a violation of their sense of honor, a deep insult. It one examines further the way ir which the struggles over workers' insurance were fought at that time, one finds that, to a certain extent, the German Social Democrats themselves feared that Bismarck might succeed in diverting the proletariat from the revolutionary path through his insurance laws. The delusion that workers' insurance had limited the development opportunities of the trade unions persisted for a long time and clouded the vision of even such bold minds as August Bebel.[3] Social Democracy suffered no setback as a result of workers insurance; on the contrary, its popularity increased and its power increased through the position of power achieved by the workers' representatives in the insurance organizations. This proves that when assessing a state action, one must consider not only the intentions pursued by the government or the ruling classes, but also the consequences that the measure must entail within the modern social machinery. Workers' insurance was a conquest of the Social Democrats, although it was intended as a means of struggle against them. The Social Democrats' position on the nationalization of the railways was much simpler. For here the government pursued no socio-political or even economic plans at all; rather, the nationalization took place for military reasons. The Social Democrats opposed it because they did not want to increase the power of the state that was raping them. At present, there is hardly anyone who

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[3] I first opposed this in my 1896 work "The Trade Unions and Social Democracy."

would want to undo the Prussian nationalization of the railways The German example has since been imitated by other states, and the expediency of nationalizing the railways is generally recognized, both for military and financial and economic reasons. Social Democracy no longer fundamentally opposes the nationalization of the railways anywhere, but in some states the project has so far failed due to the resistance of capitalist railway companies, which made excessive financial demands or managed to distribute shares through parliamentary intrigue. It is precisely in France and England, the "liberal" states that are now presented to us as the bearers of civilization, for whose sake Germany was to be crushed by the Russian "roller," that these capitalist clique interests are most strongly asserted. What the government in Germany, supported by militarism, had already successfully accomplished in the 1880s, those states of bourgeois liberalism have not managed to this day. This means that militarism can also have its positive consequences.

Social Democratic Agitation under the Socialist Law.

The economic stagnation, which, as already mentioned, had made the German bourgeoisie even more timid and fearful in its behavior toward the government, intensified the Social Democratic opposition. In politics, national liberalism, the Socialist Law, Bismarck's failed Kulturkampf; in industry, business stagnation; in agriculture, a creeping crisis; new military bills, new taxes, rising bread tariffs; and, at the same time, unemployment and tight wages. The great workers' tribune, August Bebel, expressed the mood of the German working class at that time in glowing words. He remained in this mood later on, throughout his life, and took it with him to the grave. For Bebel, bourgeois society no longer existed at all. It had destroyed itself. What emerged were only products of decomposition He compiled folders for the symptoms of this decomposition, of the process of decay in all areas of social life and politics, and presented them in his budget speeches, which he shaped into a grim picture. Illuminated by the burning anger of the proletarian fighters as if by a subterranean fire; this grim depiction then formed the backdrop for an apotheosis of socialism, delivered in the pale blue colors of the

Christian sky.[4] He castigated the bourgeoisie and the government, making those in power appear

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[4] Around this time, K. Kautsky formulated his theory of chronic overproduction, thereby proving that he lacked the most basic prerequisites for understanding the development of industry and the capitalist world market. : The scheme of capitalist development established by K. Marx proved to be an excellent guide for countries in which capitalist industry was just beginning to make its entrance. Therefore, Marxism became the preparatory schoolfor bourgeois statesmen, first in Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, and then in Russia. The French and English found in Marx only new formulas for already known facts. Their interest was therefore less. In addition, Marx's main work is written in a way that makes it inaccessible to the masses. In his work "K. Marx's Economic Teachings," K. Kautsky believed he could improve on Marx by paraphrasing him. He took the ideas from Marx, the style from Kautsky, and reduced the whole to, a size that best suited the public education needs of the publisher J. H.W. Dietz. In the process, juice and power were lost. He made matzah out of Marx's leaven. The difficulties of Marx's main work do not lie in the fact that Marx did not know how to write clear German. He was one of the best German stylists. The difficulties lie, first, in the tremendous condensation of ideas, and second, in the structure of the work. Marx began, as is well known, with his "Critique of Political Economy." This was a critique of theories, of views, from which a critique of capitalist conditions emerged. In the course of the work, the latter becomes Marx's main purpose. He now decides to give an account of capitalist conditions, from which he rejects and rebukes the theories of political economy. The procedure is thus reversed; at the same time, Marx embarks on a new field of research: the facts of industrial development and capital formation, technology, conditions in factories. In addition to political-economic systemizations, he now uses histories of trade and the English Blue Books. This is "Capital," Volume 1. However, since he still keeps the critique of political economy in mind, as the starting point of his presentation, like classical political economy the exchange process. He provides an analysis of the commodity from which, via the law of value, at production and the social relations behind it value itself remains

unproven. For this does not arise from exchange, but of production; it is a social relationship and must first break through millions of disturbances in the commodity trade, whereby the law itself appears as a disturbance It becomes all the more sharply apparent the more capitalist production is fully developed and the equalization of production, trade, and credit conditions the standardization of prices and wages, limit the arbitrary in the exchange process (Fr. Engels believed, conversely, to have observed the purest effect of the law of value at the time of the handicrafts industry). This wasia misunderstanding of. the very essence of the law of value, as Marx conceives it. I exposedthis error in 1896 in Die Neue-Zeit. I pointed out the social character of the problem as early as 1892, i.e., several years before the publication of the third volume of "Capital," in my articles against Böhm-Bawerke also in Die Neue Zeit. K Marx derives the law of value conceptually, this derivation is speculative and arbitrary. We know that production is: based on social laborbut wexcannot see from commodities that the relationship of the socially necessary labortime contained in them asserts itselfin their exchange. Instead of clarying above all, the social relations of production from which the conditions of commodity arise, Marx undertakes to unravel the tangle into which social relations have become intertwinedlin the commodity, where all corners and ends have already been covered up and the memory ofeven thersocial origin has been erased. The presentation is therefore abstract and complicated and fails to evoke in the layperson the liberating feeling of clear insight. As abstract and speculative as Marx's discussion of the law of value is, his further presentation is just as lively and even dramatic, despite the brittle material Workers and the factory owner appear as acting individuals to clarify the mutual position of the wage-earning and capitalist classes within social production. From then on, however, the investigation splits. One path pursues the fate of the working class, the other the movement and transformations-of capital. With this, Marx enters a third area of research: previously he discussed the relationships between wage-earning and capitalist within individual enterprises; now (Volumes Il and Ill of Capital) he deals with the relationships between capitalists. His literary sources from now on are stock exchange and commercial reports, bank statements,

and so on. Political economy ceases almost entirely. The personal aspect of the portrayal is lost. The foreground comes the larger capitalist context, which submits to and guides the will of the individual. It is no longer a drama, but a tragedy. dominated by a merciless fate Only now does it fully become clear that capitalism is not a malicious Invention, allarge scale fraud, but a system ot production and exchange, along with a corresponding property order, which arises from the entire historical development of society and must be overcome by it. The actors now reappear, but their number has increased and they have partly changed their form. First, the wage laborer was simply contrasted with the capitalist; now it is the wage laborer, the entrepreneur, the financier, the merchant, the landowner. At this point, the work breaks off, as Marx's life thread has been severed. The theory of competition envisioned by Marx is missing i.e., the presentation of how classes, groups, and individuals within the social structure provided by capitalism struggle among one another for acquisition and economic power. Because this conclusion is missing, a fatalistic streak runs through the work, which caused much harm in people's minds. It is as if, instead of entering the house through the open door, Marx were leading one over the roof and through the chimney. Once one has overcome the narrow and dark passage of Marx's exposition of the law of value, one arrives at bright, wide rooms. However, having climbed over the chimney, one has brought with one the wrong perspective, and the house appears upside down. If Marx had taken production with its social relations as his basis, the system could be constructed easily and freely, and one-sidednesses that now cloud his scientific investigation would have been avoided. Thus, he narrows capitalist development far too much to industrialism, and industrialism to mechanism, which in turn is very one-sidedly understood merely as a labor-saving method The introduction of new production processes and new industries, the differentiation and enrichment of consumption and, with it, the market, the repercussions of consumption on production in general, the manifold effects of world trade, the expansion of the consumer circle through the economic rise of larger social classes, the expansion of production through the development of culture, the role of the state and the communes in the development of

petty and worthless, showed the masses their misery and promised them a future that corresponded to their longings, and he always stood as an upright, sincere man who shared with his wholesoul the indignation, the sorrow, and the hopes of the masses— therefore, he swept them along with him. At the same time, he was an intimate connoisseur of the development of the bourgeois parties and their active members, and he knew better than anyone how to expose their inadequacy and indecision. In foreign policy, his hatred of Russian Tsarism was surpassed only by that of W. Liebknecht, who never tired of pointing to the liberation of Poland, i.e., the destruction of the Tsarist Empire A. Bebel and W. Liebknecht certainly never dreamed that the fact that they had refused to agree to the annexation of a French province after a victorious war could serve as a justification for the French socialists in their plan to bring the Tsarist armies all the way to Berlin. If they did not want the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, that did not mean that they were prepared to hand over East Prussia and Galicia to Russia without resistance. And they were not sentimental fools either; they knew that the Tsarist armies could not be defeated with platitudes about the sanctity of the International, but only with the weapons of the German General Staff The fight against Tsarism was one of the most popular means of agitation of the German Social Democrats. This was at the same time an attack on the Prussian government. The government was accused of maintaining and promoting its racial friendship for reasons of domestic policy, for it was preparing to rely on the Russian armies in the event of a German revolution. Often enough, the sycophancy before Russia and the groveling before the Tsarist throne were rebuked in the harshest terms, and it was pointed out that by attending to the affairs of the Tsardom, the worst danger was brought upon Germany itself It is well known that K. Marx predicted the annexation of France to Russia as early as 1871. But that, of course, does not mean that he would approve of this annexation. On the contrary, he feared it and saw it as a danger for Europe and Germany. Undoubtedly, Bebel and Liebknecht's position on the question of the

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social production and in the mechanics of the capitalist accumulation and distribution process- All of this is given little or almost no consideration in Marx's main work. In this respect, Capital lags significantly behind the "Communist Manifesto."

annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was not only based on general reasons of justice, but also on consideration of the political consequences of the annexation. They wanted to spare France so as not to throw it into the arms of Tsarist Russia. So, again and again, the Russian danger! And then political hollow-minds to be able to construct a contrast between the current stance of German Social Democracy and the position taken by Bebel and Liebknecht at that time. lt What appears to them as a political consequence would in reality be an automatic parroting of one and the same word, as occurs with cerebral paralysis. They resemble the fool in the fairy tale who has been taught a congratulations and who repeats it when he encounters a funeral procession. Thus, German Social Democracy has criticized bourgeois society, the parties, and the government's domestic and foreign policies; the whole, however, was summarized by the struggle against the Socialist Law and directed toward a close, clear goal.

"The German model."

In 1889, the International Socialist Congress met in Paris. German Social Democracy was celebrated as the champion of the world proletariat. From the outset, it demonstrated itself as the strongest bulwark of the International and remained the leading socialist party until the outbreak of war. The socialist parties of other countries consciously sought to imitate "the German model." Where did the international prestige of German Social Democracy come from? First of all, from the fact that socialism in other countries had no outstanding successes to show after the fallof the Paris Commune It was action that impressed. The successes of German Social Democracy instilled new confidence and hope in the socialists of other countries and encouraged them to take a vigorous stand. The German Social Democrats did not need to instruct the socialists of other countries about the expediency of the international union of the proletariat. The history of the First International took place primarily in those countries. But in order for this bold undertaking to be attempted again and put into practice, the socialist workers in the leading countries first had to trust in the power of the movement, and this happened after the successes of German Social Democracy. It is a common idea that Marxism made German Social Democracy strong and determined its influence abroad. Marxism did away with a number of false historical and economic ideas with which socialist agitation was/mixed and gave the class struggle of the

proletariatia broad scientific basis; nevertheless, it was not Marx's ideas that nade German Socia:Democracy popularirathe t was German social Democracy that brought these ideas to international attention. The respect for the concentrated power that German Social Democracy developed also increased interest in K. Marx, whose ideas carried this movement.[5] Concentrated power was what impressed outside Germany have never lacked bold ideas. But there was always a great disproportion between the political plans and the political power of the socialists. That is why they appeared like dreamers. This time, however, one saw the growth of a well-organized power of the socialist proletariat in Germany, one that was impressive in all respects. This had to result in tactical changes. Previously, the element or surprise played a major role in socialist tactics: Since socialist organizations were weak, they set themselves the task of controlling the masses through a conspiracy which they set in motion as a result of major political conflicts, ie at

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[5] The extent to which pure revolutionism, which focused everything on the imminent general battle, made the Social Democratic Party leadership conservative and indecisive on all questions that went beyond party traditions, was perhaps best seen in its relationship to the development of the daily press. First, it wanted to restrict the development of the provincial press in order to implement tighter centralization. Second, it saw a danger in the workers' press striving to achieve the type of modern daily newspapers instead of preserving its character as a purely agitational sheet. Third, it regarded the acquisition of its own printing presses, which laid the foundation for a proper newspaper operation, as a risky adventure. This ban was broken by Dr. Bruno Schönlank, who placed the Leipzig Social Democratic Party paper on a modern basis. The Dresdeners followed the Leipzigers on my initiative. When, on behalf of the Dresden party organizations, I approached the party association in Berlin for support for our venture, we were not granted a single penny All I brought back from Berlin was my friend Dr. B.'s promise to acquire shares for 5,000 marks, and a promise from Dr. Z. for 1,000 marks. The latter was withdrawn a day later, after a sharp article against E. Bernstein appeared in the newspaper I edited. The unions provided the money needed to organize the newspaper's operations in abundance.

the time of revolution. This tactic originates directly from the land of revolution, France. Every time the French bourgeoisie came into a revolutionary clash with the government, the socialists attempted to place themselves at the head of the working masses in order to seize state power. This then became the guiding rule of socialist tactics. Revolution was thus the true prerequisite of socialist activity. Socialism emerged as a specific revolutionary party that can only live ano breathe in revolution. But revolution is not constant. What should one do in the great intervals where there are no revolutionary clashes?, There was no answer to this. All hopes were placed in revolution: outside of revolution, there was onlydesolation: People even feared that if a long time passed without revolution, the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat would wane. They feared that parliamentarism would distract the proletariat from its great social-revolutionary tasks. They even feared the trade unions because they supposedly channeled the class energy of the proletariat in the struggle and wasted time on small tasks. Everywhere, people saw dangers to the revolutionism of the proletariat, on which the success of the revolutionary coup depended solely and exclusively: and which was to secure socialism's seizure of political power. They saw no other way out than the most rapid bringing about of the revolution—a tactic that completely misjudged the historical character of revolutions. Then came the German Social Democracy and showed that, even outside of the revolution, by exploiting the proletariat's parliamentary rights, they could form a strong organized, disciplined political party with a social-revolutionary fighting goal. Now they knew what they had to do before the revolution began, and they sought everywhere to imitate the German model. The task was actually to create a power out of the proletariat as a class that always and everywhere, in parliamentary machinery, in revolution, in war, remains true to itself, thus primarily representing the class interests of the proletariat. However, one was aware of this, even within the ranks of the German Social Democracy was not clearly aware of this, even less so abroad. Rather, the problem was sharpened as follows: by exploiting parliamentary means, to create a power from the proletariat that would be strong enough to bring about the revolution. The Anti-Socialist Law fell. It was followed by Bismarck. That was a triumph of German Social Democracy that astonished the world. 25 years have already passed since then, a quarter of a century. Since then, German Social Democracy has expanded enormously. But it has lost the clarity and decisiveness of its tactics. The Socialist Law

gave social democratic agitation a clear and immediate goal. The main thing was the social revolution, but first and foremost, the Socialist Law hadsto be abolished: That was simple and obvious. When the Socialist Law fellsa sensitive gap immediately became apparent: what should be the immediate goal of the struggle? For it was clear that the great confrontation with capitalist, society, the socialisrevolution, could not be staged immediately. It was obviously necessary to bring to the forefront a practical demand that directly addressed the proletariat in its class interest. A major effort in this direction had already been made under the Socialist Law. That was the demand for an eight-hour day, put forward at the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1889 The demand was put forward to surpass state socia policy, to direct agitation toward an immediate proletarian I, and to unite the proletariat internationally in the practical struggle foelts class interests. From the same perspective, May Day celebrations were decided upon as a complement to the agitation for the eight-hour day. The May Day celebrations were by no means intended as the harmless peace demonstration into which they later developed. It was supposed to be the grand parade, the mobilization of the social-revolutionary proletariat and its training in international revolutionary action. But the German Social Democrats did not dare to take the matter seriously. They retreated slowly but consistently across the board. It was easy to fight against the socialist Law. Firstly, one had to. The law was there, the government had created it, and there was nothing left to do but fight it. Secondly; it was enough to remain on the defensive. If the Social Democrats showed that they could resist the law, that their development could not be stopped by the Socialist Law, then the game was won. But now it was time to move from the defensive to the offensive. Now it was no longer enough to resist being defeated; one had to impose one's will on the government and the parties. A large fighting apparatus had to be developed, and a risk had to be taken. But it was precisely the successes of the Social Democrats under the Socialist Law that taught them to avoid risk. The principle established under the Socialist Law was: "not to allow oneself to be provoked!" We accept the fight when it suits us. That was quite right. But gradually, tactic developed from this of avoiding any major conflict But anyone who consistently avoids a serious clash in battle cannot make progress. Both the defensive and the offensive have their specific prerequisites. One can achieve one's goal just as little with the one alone as with the other. Opinions within the German Social Democrats were

divided. There were a number of noisemakers who wanted the fight for the sake of the fight itself. They demanded a sharper tone from the Social Democratic faction in parliament; they wanted to press the government and the bourgeois parties to the utmost to provoke in order to bring about an open conflict. They wanted to give the state a battle without first assessing its forces and without specifying an immediate goal of the struggle. Certainly, the "final goal" was there. But that was, so to speak, the great goal of the campaign; for each individual battle, however, one must first know what is being fought for and which positions are to be conquered. The result of this tactic would have been the triggering of chaotic fighting. The German Social Democrats rightly did not want to get involved in that. Unfortunately, these political inconsistencies brought the idea of the proletarian offensive into disrepute. On the other hand, G Vollmar, on the contrary, recommended a softening of tone. He believed that we could achieve success if we were more conciliatory toward the government. He wanted us to adapt to government policy, while in reality the point was to force the government to adapt to proletarian demands. The government itself had no intention of reconciling with the Social Democrats; rather, it was preparing its coup proposals, and the working masses, buoyed by the feeling of victory over Bismarck, were least of all inclined to make a pact with the government. The decisive tactic became the gathering of forces in order to deliver a general battle to the capitalist state at the appropriate moment. Therefore, above all, avoid any dissipation of forces. All attention must be directed to the great struggle ahead. No sidetracking, no secondary goals! No modern campaign can be won in a single battle. The same applies to politics. The idea that the social revolution could be prepared secretly in such a way that the goal could be achieved with a single major blow was a terrible illusion. Before the proletariat can achieve political power, it must first learn to assert itself politically. Its will must be strengthened through political struggles. Its courage must be increased through political success. It is precisely the proletariat, the oppressed class, that must firstLearn to dare great things. The characterization that Karl Marx gave the proletariat in the Communist Manifesto, as the social class that has nothing to lose and is therefore always ready for revolution, was misleading and caused great harm. New worlds cannot be built with the courage of despair. The proletariat that Marx had in mind could hand over the masses to a handful of conspirators who wanted to seize power, but was incapable of

pursuing an independent state policy. For this, political training, the expansion of organizations, a certain social and cultural advancement were necessary, and it was necessary for the proletariat to learn to face major political problems and to implement them. The despairing mass is pessimistic; it rejects everything because it sees no salvation anywhere, and precisely for this reason it is extremely timid and timid in its political demands and plans The pressure of necessity reduces its expectations and hopes for life. That is why it is easily prepared to let everything go to hell. On the contrary, a class's struggle for power requires endurance and confidence in victory. The proletariat had to learn to see itself not merely as the force capable of overrunning the state, but as the foundation on which the entire social order, and with it the power of the state, is built. Only then could it learn to demand and achieve. The irrationality of the tactics, which focused all of the party's activity on a single great general battle, was concealed by the fact that this general battle was imagined as imminent. Therefore, it was only necessary to be patient for a short time, and then the solution to the problem would come of itself. This tactic was strong in negations. Nationalizations, no, because by doing so we would strengthen the power of the state, against which we soon intend to deliver the great general battle. Trade unions, doubtful, because by doing so the attention of the proletariat would be diverted from the great goal of the struggle. Moreover, success is uncertain, and it is not worthwhile that we concern ourselves with this, since we will soon conquer the state through the great general battle to uproot the capitalist economy, and make the trade union struggle superfluous. Consumer cooperatives are nonsense, they merely fool the workers; it is not about organizing consumption, but about seizing the means of production, and we will soon achieve that through our great general battle. The struggle for the eight-hour day and the May Day celebrations were postponed because it was feared that if we became too strongly involved in these questions, we might be forced to fight the great general battle sooner than we considered expedient. Meanwhile, time passed, and the longer it lasted, the more the general battle seemed to move away from us instead of closer. The resulting party situation will be described later. For now, we only want to account for the origin of the growth of German Social Democracy during this period First, the class position of the proletariat. The German working class will never return to the ranks of the bourgeois parties. On the other hand, the existence of the independent workers' party will always exert a tremendous attraction on the

workers who still remain outside it. German Social Democracy could only be weakened by splits; no danger threatens it from outside. As long as the unity of the organization is maintained, German Social Democracy will, despite all struggles and all tactical changes, continue to expand its organizations. Moreover, the German governments took ample care to ensure that Social Democracy did not run out of material for agitation. The bourgeois parties bowed to the government and feared Social Democracy. They counted almost entirely politically. Germany, with its world industry, was governed agrarianly. The greatest resistance to this policy was offered by Social Democracy. It was therefore in the foreground of the parliamentary struggles, which drew the attention of the masses. Moreover, during this time, the German proletariat found an outlet for its class struggle in the trade unions. A tremendous amount of work was accomplished here, demanding numerous forces. Here, too, proletarian successes were achieved that inevitably increased the courage and confidence of the class. And once again, the German proletariat showed that it was going its own way. It had created trade union centralizations that far surpassed the famous model of the English trade unions. Within two decades, from modest beginnings, the German trade unions had surpassed the English ones in membership and revenue. And now, it is no longer the English but the German organizational model that determines the central associations. The English workers themselves are making every effort to imitate the German trade unions, for nowhere else is the principle of centralization implemented as consistently in trade unioneorganizations as in Germany The central associations are an indispensable condition for a large scale international organization of trade unions. By showing that this organizational principle can be implemented purposefully ano consistently throughout an entire country, the German workers have set the direction for other countries and thus laid the foundations for international associations. Another example of how the best way to achieve international proletarian unification lies not in the exchange of politeness, but in the establishment of strong organizations, in the representation of the proletarian class interests in one's own country. The successes of the German trade unions in regulating workers' wages and working hours have raised the courage and self-confidence of the German working class. During this period, the initiative of the German workers was also very strong and successful in the field of consumer cooperatives. Finally, the expansion of the Social Democratic press, which took

place during this period, should also be mentioned. In this respect, too, German Social Democracy stands unrivaled in the history of the socialist movement. The large Social Democratic daily newspapers, with their own, well-equipped printing presses, currently form the very backbone of the party.[6] Thus, in the period since the abolition of the Socialist Law, the German proletariat has accomplished a great deal of organization, gathering of forces, and enlightenment in extra-parliamentary areas, and this work contributed not a little to the growth of Social Democracy, even though the party's political tactics were not suitable for permanently keeping the enthusiasm of the masses alive.

The Decline.

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[6] The extent to which pure revolutionism, which focused everything on the imminent general battle, made the Social Democratic Party leadership conservative and indecisive on all questions that went beyond party traditions, was perhaps best seen in its relationship to the development of the daily press. First, it wanted to restrict the development of the provincial press in order to implement tighter centralization. Second, it saw a danger in the workers' press striving to achieve the type of modern daily newspapers instead of preserving its character as a purely agitational sheet. Third, it regarded the acquisition of its own printing presses, which laid the foundation for a proper newspaper operation, as a risky adventure. This ban was broken by Dr. Bruno Schönlank, who placed the Leipzig Social Democratic Party paper on a modern basis. The Dresdeners followed the Leipzigers on my initiative. When, on behalf of the Dresden party organizations, I approached the party association in Berlin for support for our venture, we were not granted a single penny All I brought back from Berlin was my friend Dr. B.'s promise to acquire shares for 5,000 marks, and a promise from Dr. Z. for 1,000 marks. The latter was withdrawn a day later, after a sharp article against E. Bernstein appeared in the newspaper I edited. The unions provided the money needed to organize the newspaper's operations in abundance.

Belief in the imminent revolution was gradually lost. The tactics, however, remained the same; they were still calculated on the great general battle. It was a form without content. Pure revolutionism became mere phrase. People always prepared for the great confrontation with the state, but when halfway serious conflicts arose, they were regularly avoided. No, not yet, we are not ready yet! Why? There was no answer to that. When the time has come! But decades passed, the party grew, its dimensions exceeded all expectations, and no one had yet been able to decide to take the great general battle seriously. Occasionally, attempts were made to adopt a sharper style of struggle, but as soon as the government seriously resisted, they regularly - withdrew. It was clear that German Social Democracy would never be able to decide on an assault against state power. The revolution could only take place against the will of revolutionary Social Democracy; it had to be forced upon it; only then would people recognize that the time had come.

The revolution became a scheme, an incantation. An unbridgeable gap formed between it and reality. In order not to notice this contradiction, the minds had to be specially prepared. What was needed was that "theoretical training" that was excellently carried out by K. Kautsky through "Neue Zeit." The prerequisites for this political marasmus were already evident in the Erfurt Program written by Kautsky, which German Social Democracy held sacred as the thrice-purified science According to the Communist Manifesto, nationalizations were intended to form the economic starting point of the social revolution. F. Lassalle demanded state credit for productive cooperatives. The Erfurt Program ignored the economic problems of the social revolution, the question of how the capitalist system of production and distribution should be transformed into a socialist one, with the general principle of the socialization of production. How this socialization differs from the collective enterprises already developed within capitalist society, such as nationalizations, communal enterprises, cooperatives, and joint-stock companies, no one knows. The masses believed it was something quite special, it was nothing, it was a vague concept extended into the most general terms, from which any concrete content was extracted, like a squeezed liver sausage. Should we advocate nationalization, municipalization, cooperatives? The program provided no information on this; the question could just as easily be answered with yes

as with no. The proletariat was to seize political power in order to socialize the means of production. Since no information could be given as to how this socialization was conceived, it simply meant: Let us gain possession of state power, and then we will see how things turn out. The social revolution was stripped of its social content, so that it appeared to be a purely political question The Erfurt Program knows only the impoverishment of the masses and the concentration of capital; above this, the lack of planning in production with the explosive effect of trade crises. The entire magnificent development of the world market falls outside its framework. But since this is the basis for the current struggles of the working class, these too are excluded from the program. It knows only the "final goal" in the vague "form" familiar to us and has no room for development. The perspective is colossally shortened, the contradictions metaphysically sharpened Capitalism decomposes the handicrafts, ruins the peasantry, the proletarian appears on the scene, but there the program ends! There is no room in the Erfurt Program for the proletariat's upward work within capitalist society, through which the organizational foundations are created for the socialist transformation of the state and the mode of production As an appendix, without justification, without connection to the actual program, some contemporary proletarian demands are put forward alongside the demands of bourgeois democracy. This program is not borne by the spirit of the rising proletariat, but rather it is the petty bourgeois, who threatens the capitalist with the death-bringer proletariat. The Erfurt Program hindered rather than helped the development of the trade unions. A few years after the formulation of the Erfurt Program, the aging F. Engels made the magnificent discovery that since 1848, the streets of capital cities had been widened and that, as result, successful barricade fighting wás no longer possible, especially since weapons technology had become enormously sophisticated since then. He himself objected to the idea tha victorious revolutionary uprisings were impossible from this, but the conclusion was drawn nonetheless. Even where people did not go so far as to present the revolutionary uprising as a utopia, a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty remained, which paralyzed the desire for action It took the Belgian mass strikes, the Austrian demonstrations, and the Russian Revolution to bring to general awareness that the

chances of a revolution cannot be judged solely from military-technical standpoint.[7] Socialism reduced to the meaningless concept of socialization, revolution without knowing how — to carry it out. It is clear that with such a mental state, one could not decide on anything But the party grew and prospered. Thus, one finally founa consolation for all doubts in it. The means became the end The old tactics that led us from "victory" to "victory" were praised That this old tactic had a different meaning under the Socialist Law, and yet another in the initial period after the Socialist Law, when a sharp conflict with state power was expected at any moment, and that it collapsed when this danger was eliminated-that was not seen; it was not understood. Anniversaries were celebrated. At first, these celebrations were isolated; but as the years went by, the round numbers increased, and the anniversaries became as important a factor in party enthusiasm as the veterans' festivals. Memories from the time of the Socialist Laws were dug out. People admired themselves in the mirror of the past. Between a fantastic future and a glorious past, they forgot the present. The revisionists, opportunists, etc., certainly placed greater emphasis on present-day work, but like the others, they lacked the confidence in the revolutionary power of the proletariat to pursue a generous policy. Some promised great achievements by the proletariat in an unknown future, but shied away from serious conflicts in the present; others no longer had firm faith in the promises of the future, expected even fewer great achievements from the present, and therefore resorted to compromises with the bourgeois parties or the government, thus achieving small successes. The steadfast revolutionaries of the future put on a lion's skin and roared terribly-less to frighten their enemies than to inspire courage in themselves. The opportunists cast pleading glances at the bourgeoisie: Come and weed our skin! The mood was sluggish. For many years, people had been complaining about waning enthusiasm and deadly boredom in the organizations. The only counterbalance to this was the renewed breakthrough of revolutionism, which wanted to strike immediately under all

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[7] As early as 1895, in articles in the "Neue Zeit," which later appeared a a separate pamphlet, I spoke out against the revolutionary flattery based on Engels emphasized the importance of the mass strike, and revealed the political connection of the revolutionary struggles.

circumstances. There was a certain justification in this. For struggles were indeed necessary to bring about the breakthrough of the proletariat's revolutionary energy. However, since revolution is not an end in itself for the proletariat, but can only be a means to an end, the solution did not lie in this, but rather it was necessary to put forward a proletarian demand, in the implementation of which, however, no means could be avoided. One such demand was the eight-hour day. Regardless of the way by which the proletariat achieved this goal, whether revolutionary or parliamentary, in any case it greatly increased his social standing and his political influence, and consequently also his entrepreneurial spirit. But no one dared to tackle such problems. The eight-hour day was almost forgotten. May Day celebrations became a peace festival. At the same time, the international socialist congresses increasingly took on the character of peace demonstrations. The fight against capitalism became the fight against militarism. This, in turn, transformed into propaganda for world peace. Once, social democracy did not find enough scorn and ridicule for the bourgeois ideologists who wanted to eliminate wars from the world through humanitarian or pious phrases, peace societies, and international resolutions.[8] Now it itself fought the ever-

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[8] I was never a pacifist. In particular, I considered a conflict between German Social Democracy and Russian Tsarism inevitable. It was dead certain to me that in the event of a German revolution, the Tsarist armies would cross the German border. I know very well that in such a case, the German workers would have the sympathy of the entire, socialist world on their side. It may be that, as a result, Russia would then remain isolated in its struggle against Germany; but I am by no means certain of that. The martial enthusiasm of the German army would necessarily be even greater than it is at present. But even if victories cannot be achieved without enthusiasm, enthusiasm alone is not sufficient to win battles and conduct a modern campaign. This requires a great deal of expertise organization, leadership, campaign planning -in short, the officer corps and the General Staff. Therefore. I believe it is better that the military confrontation with Russia takes place now under the leadership of the German General Staff than if it had to be undertaken by the revolutionary army without — a General Staff. But even apart from that, I had been agitating for war against Russia for many years,

increasing threat of war with phrases and resolutions that they themselves had not been able to enforce in the individual countries. The discontent generated by the fruitlessness of the struggle against the threat of war in the individual countries was brought to the International Socialist Congresses. Here people let off steam and thereby created the impression of great resistance to the war. They also deliberately wanted to provoke this impression in order to frighten the governments-in reality, however, they only revealed the impotence of socialism in the fight against war. When the war came, no one thought of striking. Instead, everyone attacked the German Social Democrats. They should have set a good example-according to the little saying: "Hannemann, you go first, you're wearing the biggest boots." But it could not have been the task of German Social Democracy to disorganize the German army at the outbreak of this war. One could no more demand that of it than, for example, that it blow up the German ammunition stocks or show the enemy armies the routes to Berlin. One confuses the efforts to prevent the outbreak of war with the behavior later, when the war has already broken out and it has therefore not been possible to prevent it.

Could the war have been prevented? The way things developed, no. But it would have been different if German Social Democracy, throughout its development since the abolition of the Socialist Law, had shown more revolutionary determination and thus gained more political

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because I considered a military defeat of Russia to be the best precondition for the Russian Revolution: When the construction of the Trans-Siberian and Central Asian railways exacerbated relations between Russia and England, I advocated an alliance between Germany and England to defeat Russia. In the Russo-Japanese War, I sided with Japan. This, of course, was not because | was impressed by capitalist modernized Japan, nor for reasons of justice, for Japan had just as little right to Korea and Manchuria as Russia did. It was because I foresaw the Russian defeat and recognized in it the preparatory work for the revolution. At that time, this position was shared by the Russian Social Democrats, as well as by all Russian revolutionaries. This has changed now, as the Russian intelligentsia has allowed itself to be influenced by the patriotism of the Russian bourgeoisie.

influence. It knew well what was necessary when it fought the government's policies. It simply had to insist on its will instead of repeatedly avoiding a decisive conflict. That would have been beneficial for the German Reich as well as for the entire world if Social Democracy had been more prominent in the Reich, Germany would have enjoyed sympathy in the world that it does not have now. The successes of the Social Democracy in the socio-political sphere, especially — German on the question of the eight-hour day, would - have immensely strengthened the position of the proletariat in all industrialized countries and strengthened international ties. Even relations with England would definitely have improved. Even if the English imperialists prepared the current world war systematically and purposefully, it would be wrong to judge the entire country from this perspective. English workers have always advocated peaceful cooperation between nations. But even among the English bourgeoisie, there are already layers who have a business interest in the development of trade relations with Germany. The only people interested in the war against Germany are those colonial Englishmen who had long since replaced business with sport and who, in the tranquil peace of their exotic existence, were disturbed by the energetic advance of German businessmen, and a few English financial and industrial cliques who would like to monopolize the world market The influence of these cliques can best be counteracted by developing trade relations between Germany and England. Since German Social Democracy fundamentally supports free trade, its influence would at least moderate Germany's protectionist tariff policy and thus contribute to the further promotion of trade relations between Germany and England, which are already very important for both countries. The business and cultural ties between Germany and England would thus be strengthened, thus counteracting the intrigues of the imperialists. Relations between Germany and France had already improved at the end of the 1890s and were developing well when England began its intrigues to encircle Germany This was what rekindled the idea of revenge in France and gave it unprecedented strength. If France realized that it could not rely on England in the event of war-which it would have to do if relations between Germany and England improved its relations with Germany would also be able to continue to develop favorably. The Oriental Question became a threat to European peace primarily because the major European powers had shifted their mutual rivalry to the Orient. The economic development of the Orient would proceed best if it were notelinked to, secondary

political goals. A lessening o tension in Europe would theretore also ensure a calmel development for the Orient. The relationship between Germany and Russia is different. The Russian socialists, who are now jumping for joy in their indignation against, German Social Democracy, only to then fall very roughly on their nationalistic backsides, can be assured that if German Social Democracy had more influence in the Reich, German policy towards Tsarist Russia would long ago have adopted a completely different tone and a completely different behavior. But if the German government had broken with its traditional friendliness towards Russia and shown more defiance and determination towards Russia, this would in turn be a factor favoring a rapprochement between Germany and England For, until the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, English policy was directed primarily against Russia.[9] It is clear that under these circumstances, the Imperial government could not have sided with the Tsarist throne during the Russian Revolution, as it actually did, but if it would have turned more towards the revolutionary, all greater the influence of Social Democracy. A decisive victory of the Russian Revolution would transform Russia into a democratic state, and a democratic Russia is only conceivable as a federation of the great nations that comprise the Empire. Thus the secular danger to the democratic development and peace of Europe would be deprived of its reactionary lifeblood. Of course, one cannot assert with certainty that the world war would have been avoided in this way, but it is undoubted that the chances for war would have been reduced and

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[9] It was perhaps the greatest mistake of German diplomacy since Bismarck's removal that, while the Reich was preparing militarily for a struggle for world domination and German world trade was creating envious people and rivals in every corner of the globe, it believed it could remain good friends with the whole world-with England, France; and Russia. The decisive factorsh in world politics were the great ocean power England and the great continental power Russia. Germany had to side with either one or the other if it did not want both against it. But since Russia was facing political and military bankruptcy as a result of its outdated political system, it was advisable for this reason alone to align itself only with England It was Russia's fiasco in the Japanese War that plunged it into England's arms.

the resistance of the proletariat would have been increased German Social Democracy was not alone in a lack of understanding how to win rights and power for itself in time. In addition, it transmitted its own cowardice to the whole world. Just as it itself had become accustomed to toying with the idea of revolution, it believed that governments would merely rattle their weapons but would never decide on a European world war. In part, it was right For in the 1980s and 1990s, a peace psychosis developed that spread through public opinion. An entire literature emerged that portrayed a European war as impossible for economic, political, and psychological reasons. The evidence was reminiscent of the reports issued at the time by scientific authorities against the introduction of railways. Social Democracy readily allowed itself to be lulled by these sentiments. In recent years, it had noticed that the mood of public opinion was changing. Then it cried out, but it was already too late in any case. What had been missed could no longer be made up for, and events grew beyond the control of Social Democracy.[10] When war came and Germany was threatened by the Russian armies, there was nothing left to do but strike back. German Social Democracy recognized that the democratic development of Europe and the German Empire, with which their own history is most closely linked, were threatened by the Tsarist armies. They had to defend themselves. Once this had been decided, there could be no doubt that leadership had to be transferred to the General Staff, which had been preparing for this struggle for decades and had the army and the state resources at its disposal. It had to be. No more words need be said about that. I by no means want to whitewash German Social Democracy. It bears a great political guilt. But that was not the fault of a single moment, of a single vote; it was a wrong tactic that was applied for 25 years and could no longer be changed at the critical moment—a guilt that had been accumulating over decades.

England and France.

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[10] If the German Social Democracy had failed to bring about a revolution, the Austrian Social Democracy had cheated itself out of a revolution.

But what was it like in the great industrial countries of the Entente, in England and France? A large section of English workers was against the war. But the English government, which boasts of its democracy on a daily basis, ignored the opinion of these working masses even more easily than the Prussian government did the peace demonstrations of the German Social Democrats. How was that possible? The reason is precisely that the English proletariat was even less able to assert itself politically than the German Social Democrats. Despite the much-praised democratic constitution! For the capitalist government and the bourgeois parties in England were far better able to thwart the development of an independent policy of the working class through cunning deceit, and corruption than the much-maligned Prussian government under Bismarck and later through force. The English workers were fooled. They limited themselves to pursuing their immediate working interests and left general policy to the capitalist class, and foreign policy to the government The government, forits part, did not spare words to pay homage to the sovereign people. They did not shy away from delving into the feelings and expressions of the workers in order to present the deception in a form that suited them best. Lloyd George developed this art to mastery. He perfumed his words with sweat, poured into them the vinegar of class hatred to adapt to proletarian sensibilities. He composed his slogans from the strongest nutrients of demagogy and baked them round and hard, like dog biscuits. The workers were lulled to sleep, and the entire English people were deceived. The English people actually they veemselves controlled their outh estini house, that became clear that secret agreements and intrigues, conducted by several individuals, had brought the entire people to the slaughter. The lack of influence of the English workers is instructive enough: it shows where things would have ended if opportunist tactics had been applied in Germany. If German Social Democracy was not revolutionary enough, then it was the misfortune of the English workers that they had no Social Democracy in the German sense at all. One secondary factor must still be mentioned, which is interesting from several perspectives. As much as the English workers were against the war, they did not take the war seriously enough. was because there was no general military conscription - This in England. It wäshwell known that the war demanded costs and sacrifices, but everyone was of the opinion that they were personally free not to embark on the adventure. That was one of the fictions of liberalism: a free labor contract and free military service! The worker allows

himself to be exploited voluntarily and allows himself to be recruited voluntarily. If he dies, he has been paid. He is worse than a slave, for he is merely a piece of merchandise. A unit of account, a figure, a monetary value! People, horses, feed sacks of ammunition, all — just the "silver bullets" of Mr. Lloyd George! And the free Briton was proud that he was not a soldier in the Prussian sense! He did not have to be one if he did not want to. But when the great war came, it brought unemployment with it: the worker had to want it! The free Briton thrown onto the pavement either had to see himself and his family go to ruin or join the army. Thus, the war itself had to create soldiers. This was what the English philanthropists, democrats, and people-enrichers speculated on! But even earlier, when hunger made this necessary, higher wages and the military lifestyle were tempting. War was perceived as a sport. And to whip up people's spirits even further, the advertising drum was beaten. They drove the blood to the brain of the common man. They persecuted him in the streets and in the bars, they gave him no peace ano quiet at home, they provoked and goaded him with large and small stabs, with shouting and clattering, with fire and tongs, like the bull in the arena. They could do iter because they had the power, the money, the press The worker was not materially free, for he depended on the wages paid him by the capitalist: one only had to close the factories, and he would have to join the army; he was not morally free, because the entire apparatus of public opinion was in the hands of the government and the ruling classes. And once the army was assembled, an era of war, developed that swept away those who remained outside. That was English democracy! — The great lie of English liberalism. Since the outbreak of the war, the French socialists have become accustomed to looking down their necks at the German Social Democracy. These Germans, who haven't even made it to the republic yet! The French forget that they owe their third republic in large part to the defeats inflicted on them by the German armies in 1870/71. But apart from that, the opinion in France seems to be that the republican form of government entitles one to everything and obliges one to nothing vis-à-vis foreign countries. One would think that precisely the republican form of government, which assured the masses of the people a decisive influence on government policy, would prompt the French socialists to most readily and with all their energy to opppose war. Instead, they used this as justification for allying themselves with the Tsarist regime in order to secure its domination over Europe. lIf the English workers had been

deceived, the French workers were betrayed-betrayed by their leaders, who had attained power and prestige at their expense and were now allied with the most wicked dynasty in the world to indulge an insatiable ambition. That things were allowed to come to this, however, was the fault of the French workers, who failed to exploit republican freedoms and rightsato expand their trade union organizations and form a strong, purposeful Social Democratic Party that would represent theclassanterests of the proletariatkeep its leaders in check,, and not allow itself to be beguiled by republican phrase-mongers One of the reasons that prevented this development was the republican form of government itself. The government did not stand above the people or separate from them; it was formally subject to the popular will. It changed regularly and irregularly. While, in view of the strong, independent government in monarchical Germany, it was clear to the masses that if they wanted to overthrow the government, they would have to form a force capable of overthrowing the state, in France, on the contrary, it seemed easy to seize the government, which would then give them a handle on which to overthrow the state. This was also in keeping with the revolutionary traditions. The parliamentary interplay of ministerial overthrow and cabinet formation reinforced these illusions Added to this is the much greater experience and skill of the bourgeois parties in parliamentary struggles and demagogic tricks than in Germany, the tradition of the Great French Revolution with which the bourgeois republicans clothed themselves, and the self-confidence of the French bourgeoisie, which also made a certain impression on the workers. It was difficult to tear the French workers away from the republican mishmash that shimmered in all colors. This work was carried out primarily by Jules Guesde and his friends. In the 1880s, the Guesdists stood as a united, goa -oriented, socialist workersparty modeled on the German model. But the stronger the party grew, the more difficult it became to maintain its independent parliamentary position. The liberal forms of political life in the Republic offered the growing party a thousand temptations to exploit its power while sacrificing its independent class position. The decisive factor was the Dreyfuss Affair. Jules Guesde sharply recognized at the time the danger of political distraction that threatened the party as a result of the great political confusion that this affair resulted in. However, he fell into the opposite extreme and did not want to notice that the Dreyfuss case was developing into a major confrontation with the reactionary forces in France Because he wanted

to prevent the workers from taking a stand in these great struggles, which was impossible, he thereby encouraged the tactics of the others who, by way of protecting republican liberties, were moving toward ministerialism. Jean Jaurès understood the agitational significance of the Dreyfuss Affair, but was initially undecided on the question of participation in the ministry.[11] Later, when ministerialism became a method, he recognized the danger and sought to counteract it by uniting and disciplining the party. That was certainly the right path. But ministerialism was a fact and proved to be a major obstacle to the development of an independent policy by the Socialist Party. After contact with the Ministry had been established, there was no shortage of defectors from the Socialist Party. It got to the point where the route via the Socialist Party became the shortest to reach the Ministry. And when some passed through the Ministry, a competition for portfolios developed among them. A clientele gathered around every minister or ministerial candidate. The condition for the Socialist minister and his clients, however, was that they did not abandon their connection with the working masses. For their presence in the Ministry was desired above all because they could influence the workers. Thus, confusion, corruption, and helplessness were spread into the working class In contrast to ministerialism there was growing disappointment with parliamentarism, dissatisfaction, and political

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[11] In 1900, in the presence of some party friends, I had a lengthy discussion with Jaurès on the question of participation in the ministry. He regarded Millerand's entry as a provisional measure, conditioned by the special circumstances of theipolitical moment and falling away with them. I replied that these special circumstances were indeed necessary to enable a Socialist to enter the ministry, but that once the transition was complete there would be no lack of pretexts to repeatedly justify the necessity of Socialist ministerial participation. Around the same time, the French Socialists conducted an international inquiry into the Dreyfuss affair and the question of ministerial participation. In my reply, I took the view that one must take a decisive stance against the General Staff, exploit the matter for agitation, but be careful not to assume responsibility for government policy, and under no circumstances should one enter the ministry.

skepticism. French syndicalism grew from this soil. Meanwhile, the number of socialist agitators who, as ministers with or without portfolio-ministers of yesterday, of today, of tomorrow-incoming and outgoing ministers, were causing trouble in Paris, grew. They increasingly acquired a taste for power. Retaining or regaining it became the sole goal of their endeavors. Therefore, they sought to adapt to the government milieu. This is the milieu of the ruling classes, groups, and estates. The socialist ministers made every effort to show that they understood the interests of these circles. It was a formal drill for the former proletarian revolutionaries and general strikers in capitalist state policy. In the area of domestic politics, however, all that was demanded of them was that they use the cheapest possible means to restrain the working masses from pursuing their interests. They understood this business excellently. They fed the workers with phrases, and even if they did not satisfy them, they nevertheless generated confusion and disunity, thereby paralyzing proletarian action. But in the area of foreign policy, they were viewed with suspicion. They made all the more effort to show that they had a full understanding of both French high finance and Russian imperialism. They formed a brotherhood with the banking cliques and the most notorious stock exchange knights and acquired personal patrons and protectors at the Tsar's court. England's Entente policy fell into this period. This was a godsend for political adventurers and imperialist daredevils. The Triple Alliance deluded itself into the illusion of being able to command Europe. Chauvinism revived in France. The socialist ministers, too, saw a new era emerging that opened up unlimited possibilities for their megalomania On the other hand, they noticed that their activities were viewed with increasing suspicion in working-class circles, that they had exhausted their reserves of authority and prestige, that the time was near when they would lose their influence. There was no turning back for them; therefore, they had no choice but to join in with renewed energy in the imperialist and chauvinistic activities, which soon revived the idea of revenge. Did they want war? Hardly seriously! But they needed the hype of war. France had no clear idea of what would happen. But they saw that the Central Powers were retreating from the threat of war, they saw how the Balkan War was depriving Germany of all its influence in the Orient, and so they continued to fuss. And when the great war came, everything was swept away. This is how things developed in liberal England and republican France, and thus, for the umpteenth time already, it was proven that

liberalism and the republic do not protect workers from being exploited and slaughtered in the interests of the ruling cliques. What cannot be achieved through violent measures is achieved through the coercion of necessity, through fraud and treason. There is only one remedy against this: the strengthening of proletarian power, the development of an independent proletarian This brings us to the problems that the war poses for the proletariat.

What next?

We all agree that we want a lasting peace. But that is by no means everything. The war and the political situation it created must be exploited to strengthen the political position of the proletariat. Social Democracy must emerge from the war more united and determined than before. If one looks at the developments within German Social Democracy, however, one gets the opposite impression. The old sloppiness has remained; there is a lack of ideas, disunity, and internal contradictions, so that the unity of the party itself appears threatened. The indecision it showed during peace is still disintegrating it now When the war came, the seriousness of the situation was recognized for a moment and the vote was taken for military credits. They were also under the hypnosis of the war enthusiasm that had gripped the masses. But since the masses had retreated to the trenches, they began to waver. Ed. Bernstein and K: Kautsky, who in the period following the Anti-Socialist Law best expressed the zigzag course of German Social Democracy through the seesaw of their tactical debates, set about revising the adopted resolution. The question was raised whether the moment had not come to cease military operations. The crux of the matter is that one can no more resolve to wage war than one could have resolved to risk revolution. And it they now advocate peace, they are merely following the inner faintheartedness of their tactics, which leads them to seek a position that would free them from the necessity of bearing political responsibility. For they know very well it's a good thing that the German Social Democrats are unable to prevent the continuation of the war operations. They simply want the German Social Democrats to demonstrate for peace without preventing the war. If it really depended on them whether peace were concluded immediately, they would think the matter over very carefully and probably would not come to any decision at all. They are merely looking for a loophole through which they could escape the difficulties of the problem. In

doing so, they are concerned about maintaining their international authority and believe they can achieve this through empty phrases and political half-measures One reason why people of this stripe want a quick peace is that they want to limit the casualties of war. Previously, they sought to postpone the revolution as much as possible because the greater the proletariat's strength in the revolutionary struggles, the fewer its casualties in the struggle would be. But the result of these delaying tactics was only to embroil them in a capitalist world war that killed hundreds of thousands and maimed millions. If they were to be guided now by similar sentimental reasons, the result would be a state of political unrest and capitalist struggles, which would soon bring about a new world war in a perhaps even more terrible form. We want peace. The sooner, the better. But this desire alone cannot determine our attitude toward the war; only the conditions under which the possibility of making peace presents itself can be decisive. If these conditions are acceptable, then fine; if not, the war must continue, and then it is our task to inspire the masses and not discourage them. It is folly to present the very general, abstract idea of peace as a remedy in the midst of this tremendous international struggle. Who does not know that we want peace? Is there even a person in Germany or in the other countries who does not want peace-with the exception perhaps of those who instigated the war and the shy away from taking responsibility for their terrible guilt? So, what do they want with these empty phrases? Show us how we could achieve peace, show us a viable path to resolve the difficulties—that is what it is all about. The proletariat must hold fast to one thing: that after the war it will promote the free development of every nation in economics, trade and commerce, in politics and culture, regardless of whether the nation is large or small, whether it has separated itself as a state or lives with others in the same state, just as it did before the war. But this does not apply to the Germans alone; it applies to everyone: alongside the Germans, the French, the English, the Belgians, the Russians, etc., must also adopt the same standpoint. Only in this way is harmonious cooperation and the safeguarding of peace possible. The main thing remains that the proletariat asserts itself in each individual country and pursues an independent policy. The war has wrought horrific destruction and posed enormous problems. A return to the situation as it existed before the war is not enough and is no longer possible. For the war itself has changed conditions more than many years of peaceful development could have done. This is not understood by those who see the

solution to all difficulties simply in all sides laying down their arms. They would like to let the war be undone. They would like to wake up one day and convince themselves that there was no war at all, but the whole thing was a terrible nightmare. But world history takes no notice of soft souls. The most horrific catastrophe of all time has now devastated the civilized world for over a year; the world has become different: there is much to be set up, much to be rebuilt, and we must move forward! These tremendous sacrifices of blood and suffering must not have been in vain; we must move forward! People themselves have changed In the hard life of war, with death before their eyes every day, separated from domesticity, from the bonds of family, in the loyal association of men, each of whom knew that the fate of all which are of fundamental importance for the fate of the working class as well as for the development of culture. These are above all: 1. The eight-hour day in industry, 2. The transformation of the elementary school into a genuine public educational institution. The fulfillment of these demands is, incidentally, also the basic condition of a sensible state policy; for in this way the colossal loss of popular strength caused by the war can be mostodid selman soda be ocracy succeed in setting an example in this direction, it would thereby shift the interests of the peoples from the national to the social sphere, instill new courage in the proletarians of all countries, and effectively promote the international cooperation of the proletariat. We do not want to return to our former powerlessness. We want to become a power. This, the powerful position of the proletariat in every state and its world unification while sateguarding the interests of every individual nation, is also the only guarantee of lasting peace

-- Parvus